By Jim Green
Before the end of the year, the government will decide whether another nuclear research reactor is to be built in Australia. The HIFAR reactor, located at Lucas Heights, just south of Sydney, cannot operate beyond 2003 unless it undergoes a major safety upgrade, costing $150 million. A decision must also be made about storage and disposal of 1600 spent fuel rods stored at Lucas Heights; there will be no storage space for additional fuel rods by the end of 1998.
The upgrade option has some attractions for the government, but it is not supported by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO).
HIFAR was originally built to assist the development of nuclear power, but that motive has long since passed.
While there is little high-level support for nuclear weapons capability at the moment, there is support within political, military and nuclear establishments for maintaining and developing civil nuclear expertise and facilities in case a weapons program is ever considered necessary. This is the argument for a new research reactor put by the Australia Defence Association, a private lobby group which counts among its patrons senior politicians from the Liberal Party and the ALP, as well as high-ranking military brass.
If Australia had a new reactor, plus a reprocessing plant (proposed to deal with the stockpile of radioactive waste), then the government would have the capacity to both produce and separate plutonium or highly enriched uranium from spent fuel — the crucial ingredient for a bomb.
Australia could not credibly oppose efforts of other countries in the region to develop the capacity to produce and separate fissile material if it also had that capacity. The irony here is that pro-reactor campaigners argue, straight-faced, that a new research reactor would assist in the pursuit of the nation's non-proliferation aims.
National interest
Don't expect much discussion on nuclear weapons proliferation in the coming months. This topic has been submerged within a broader debate over whether a new reactor is in the "national interest".
One of the national interest arguments concerns Australia's place on the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. There is little evidence that Australia has a positive influence on the IAEA board, which has no less than 35 members.
The IAEA has itself made comments suggesting that Australia's uranium industry, and involvement in nuclear technical assistance programs, are more important determinants of Australia's status as a board member than the operation of a research reactor.
Even without a new reactor, Australia would have a place on the IAEA board on a rotating basis. And with a new reactor, Australia's status as a permanent board member may be challenged by other regional countries with a growing nuclear infrastructure, such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.
Another argument is that maintaining reactor expertise means ANSTO can continue to assist in safeguards monitoring of nuclear materials and facilities. Uranium is the only Australian nuclear export requiring safeguards monitoring (and then only after conversion to uranium hexafluoride).
Reactor expertise is of no relevance in relation to monitoring uranium exports. Reactor expertise would be of use when inspecting reactor facilities overseas, as some ANSTO staff have done through the IAEA, but the IAEA safeguards regime would not be much the poorer without the handful of Australian inspectors who have been involved.
It is also argued that the government is reliant on ANSTO for "objective" advice on nuclear matters. ANSTO's history is one of advocacy of, and/or involvement in, nuclear weapons, "peaceful" nuclear explosions, the British weapons tests, nuclear power, even "nuking" termite nests and beehives.
The views which have been accepted and argued by ANSTO employees have sometimes been nothing less than fantastic. Just last year, former chief executive Keith Alder published a book in which he argues that Australia risks invasion from energy-starved Asian countries if we do not mine and export uranium (Australia's Uranium Opportunities).
Yet another national interest argument is that operating a research reactor helps in assessing nuclear terrorist threats or, as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade puts it, the "clandestine practices of certain countries".
While there might be examples when ANSTO is able to provide useful information concerning the technical aspects of safeguards or covert weapons programs, those instances are likely to be infrequent. Security and intelligence networks are of far greater importance than any information ANSTO could provide, and it is unclear that such information would be dependent on the skills associated with the operation of a reactor.
Moreover, a research reactor could itself be targeted by terrorists. ANSTO has been subject to terrorist threats and sabotage in the past.
In 1983, significant quantities of gelignite and ammonium nitrate were found inside the boundary fence along with three detonators. The following year, a threat was made to fly an aircraft packed with explosives into HIFAR; the culprit was charged and found guilty on two counts of causing public mischief.
Most of the public debate in the coming months — if there is a serious public debate — will concern mundane issues such as neutron beam research, radioisotope production and nuclear medicine.
Certainly some interesting neutron science research could be carried out with a new reactor. But it would not be cutting-edge stuff — the proposed reactor would still leave Australia out of the world top 10 in terms of neutron flux levels. An alternative which needs serious scrutiny is for the government to provide more funding for Australian scientists to visit overseas facilities.
Another option which warrants systematic independent study is a spallation source — devices which use a particle accelerator to direct a beam onto a primary spallation target which, in turn, generates a neutron beam.
Spallation sources have advantages over reactors in terms of safety and radioactive waste. There have been rapid technical advances in recent years with spallation technology, with implications for neutron science and also for radioisotope production.
Radioisotopes
A new reactor for radioisotope production? A decade ago, this might have been a good, if not decisive, argument for a new reactor, but not today. A glut has emerged on the international radioisotope market, and the prospects for reliable, affordable importation of radioisotopes are better than ever.
ANSTO claims that imported isotopes cost too much, but this ignores the subsidising of radioisotope production in Australia in areas such as capital costs, reactor decommissioning and waste disposal.
The fear-mongering about that unavailability of short-lived radioisotopes is grossly overblown. In the absence of a domestic reactor, Australia would still have access to the four most commonly used isotopes, which account for over 95% of nuclear medicine procedures. In addition, we would have access to dozens of other isotopes, whether imported or produced by the cyclotrons in Sydney or Melbourne.
As for the small number of isotopes that would not be available — I know of just three — they are used very infrequently, and there are alternative isotopes or alternative non-isotope procedures.
Cyclotron technology continues to advance at a rapid pace, as does the range of medical applications of cyclotron radioisotopes. The cutting edge of nuclear medicine is the use of cyclotron radioisotopes in positron emission tomography (PET). About 35 dedicated radioisotope-production cyclotrons are in operation around the world, and many others are used in part for radioisotope production.
Nuclear medicine is also under increasing pressure from non-radioisotope technologies, in large part because of radioactive waste problems. These alternative technologies include imaging modalities — such as computerised tomography, magnetic resonance imaging and x-radiology — and also chemical and biological alternatives to radioisotopes for in vitro studies and research.
As for industrial and commercial applications, studies have demonstrated that a new reactor would be a major economic burden. If the prices charged to industry, for purposes such as mineral sampling, were increased to cover costs, industry simply would not use ANSTO's services.
Some of the ideas mentioned require a detailed investigation, carried out independently of ANSTO. There are several other unresolved questions, including the most suitable site for a reactor and its environmental and public health impact.
It is vital that a public inquiry be held before decisions are made concerning a new reactor and waste disposal. But don't hold your breath. Minister for Science and technology Peter McGauran told me that the 1993 Research Reactor Review did not recommend a further review, although it plainly said, "If, at some later stage, a new reactor is envisaged, it should be assessed by a new panel possibly operating within the Environmental Protection Act, 1974".
An interdepartmental committee has reportedly been deliberating on the issues in Canberra, but no information has been released on the committee's activities, and there has been no opportunity for public input. The rumour is that decisions have been made.